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THE	  CJEU	  VIS-­‐À-­‐VIS	  EU	  AND	  NON-­‐EU	  INVESTORS,	  BETWEEN	  NATIONAL	  AND	  
EUROPEAN	  SOLIDARITY:	  GOLDEN	  SHARES,	  SOVEREIGN	  INVESTMENT	  AND	  
SOCIO-­‐ECONOMIC	  PROTECTIONISM	  UNDER	  FREE	  MOVEMENT	  RULES*°	  
	  
Daniele	  Gallo**	  	  	   Abstract	  	  The	   fundamental	   issue	   underlying	   this	   essay	   is	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   EU’s	   aims	   of	  market	  integration	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  intervention	  of	  Member	  States	  in	  the	   economy	   and	   welfare	   provision	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	   public	   functions	   by	   national	  authorities	  in	  sensitive	  industrial	  sectors.	  In	  this	  respect	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  one	  specific	  aspect:	  the	   CJEU’s	   case	   law	   on	   the	   special	   powers	   held	   by	   the	   State	   in	   formerly	   public	   companies	  where	   the	   rights	   conferred	   on	   shareholders	   by	   ordinary	   law	   are	   reduced	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	  public	  entities.	  	  Besides	   European	   golden	   shares,	   my	   contribution	   had	   dealt	   with	   the	   access	   to	   the	   EU’s	  market	   of	   non-­‐EU	   public/private	   hybrids,	   namely	   sovereign	   investors	   such	   as	   sovereign	  wealth	  funds	  (“SWFs”)	  and	  state	  owned	  enterprises	  (“SOEs”).	  	  The	   first	  aim	  of	  my	  research	   is	   to	   investigate	   in	  what	  sense,	   to	  what	  extent	  and	   for	  what	  reasons	   the	  golden	  shares	   jurisprudence	  represents	  a	  privileged	  –	  although	  atypical	  –	  sedes	  
materiae	   to	   illustrate	   the	   content	   and	   extent	   of	   EU	   economic/market	   integration,	   the	  connection	  between	  the	  latter	  and	  the	  two	  interrelated	  concepts	  of	  social	  integration	  and	  EU	  solidarity,	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   such	   dual	   integration	   (both	   economic	   and	   social)	   on	  Member	  States’	  solidarity.	  In	  this	  regard,	  three	  main	  questions	  arise:	  has	  the	  CJEU	  been	  too	  activist	  in	  condemning	   Member	   States	   with	   regard	   to	   privat(is)e(d)	   undertakings,	   or	   is	   its	   approach	  justified	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  EU’s	   free	  market	   objectives?	   Is	   the	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   case	   law	   likely	   to	  endanger	   the	   solidarity	   on	   which	   the	   provision	   of	   SGEIs	   is	   grounded?	   Is	   the	   scope	   of	  
manoeuvre	   currently	   accorded	   to	   Member	   States	   too	   narrow	   to	   justify	   national	   socio-­‐economic	  policies	  on	  golden	  shares	  under	  the	  free	  movement	  rules	  (especially,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  further	  on,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  exceptions	  to	  these	  rules)?.	  My	  second	  general	  aim	  is	  to	   identify	  the	  main	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  access	  of	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs	   to	   the	   EU	   market	   and,	   then,	   to	   assess	   whether	   action	   by	   the	   EU	   is	   welcome	   and	  necessary	   in	   this	   area.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  main	  questions	   are:	   is	   it	   conceivable	   a	  European	  golden	   share	   to	   restrict	   this	   kind	   of	   investments	   to	   be	   shaped	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   European	  notion	   of	   solidarity?	   Should	   the	   CJEU	   be	   proactive	   and,	   for	   instance,	   admit	   ‘new’	   Cassis-­‐
Gebhard	  overriding	  reasons	  of	  general	   interest	   that	  could	  not	  be	  admitted	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   intra-­‐EU	  investments?	  Could	  the	  derogation	  provided	  for	  in	  Art.	  65.1	  b)	  allow	  for	  a	  restriction	  that	   is	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compatible	  with	  EU	  law?	  And	  in	  that	  case,	  what	  kind	  of	  connection	  would	  there	  be	  between	  national	  and	  European	  solidarity?	  	  	   SUMMARY:	   1.	   Introduction.	   1.1.	   Structure	   and	   aims	   of	   the	   analysis.	   1.2.	   The	   interplay	  between	   public	   services	   and	   strategic	   industries,	   golden	   shares,	   sovereign	   investment,	   and	  socio-­‐economic	  protectionism:	  solidarity	  within	   the	  EU	  and	  the	  scope	  of	   the	   free	  movement	  rules	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   EU	   and	   non-­‐EU	   investors.	   –	   2.	   Intra-­‐EU	   investments	   and	   golden	   shares.	   2.1.	  Public	  services,	  social	  regulation	  and	  European	  solidarity.	  2.2.	  Golden	  shares	  and	  freedom	  of	  movement:	   European	   market-­‐oriented	   solidarity	   and	   economic	   regulation	   vs.	   national	  welfare-­‐oriented	   solidarity	   and	   social	   regulation.	   2.3.	   The	   transformation	   of	   the	  public/private	  divide,	  the	  horizontal	  application	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  rules,	  and	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  protectionism.	  2.4.	  General	   (economic?)	   interest	  and	   the	   internal	  market:	  the	   role	   of	   Art.	   106.2	   TFEU	   within	   a	   “social	   market	   economy”.	   3.	   Non-­‐EU	   investments,	  sovereign	   wealth	   funds	   (SWFs)	   and	   state	   owned	   enterprises	   (SOEs).	   3.1.	   The	  capital/establishment	   dichotomy	   and	   the	   access	   of	   non-­‐EU	   sovereign	   investors	   to	   the	  European	  internal	  market.	  3.2.	  The	  restriction	  of	  non-­‐EU	  sovereign	  investments,	  between	  EU	  and	   national	   responses:	   the	   possible	   convergence	   of	   European	   and	   national	   solidarity.	   –	   4.	  Conclusion.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  1.1. The	   fundamental	   issue	  underlying	   this	  essay	   is	   the	   tension	  between	   the	  EU’s	  aims	  of	  market	  integration	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  intervention	  of	  Member	  States	  in	  the	   economy	   and	   welfare	   provision	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	   public	   functions	   by	   national	  authorities	  in	  sensitive	  industrial	  sectors.	  By	   “intervention”,	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   public	   economic	   services,	   i.e.	   services	   of	  general	  economic	  interest	  (“SGEIs”)	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  economic	  services	  of	  general	  interest1,	  which	  must	  be	  distinguished	   from	   the	  non-­‐economic	   social	   services	  of	   general	   interest	   that	  fall	   beyond	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   EU.2	   By	   “exercise	   of	   public	   functions”,	   I	   mean	   strategic	  sectors	   related	   to	   national	   security,	   such	   as	   defence,	   regarding	   which	   the	   EU	   is	   generally	  deferential	  to	  Member	  States’	  autonomy.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  must	  be	  stressed	  that	  while	  SGEIs	  are,	  by	  their	  nature,	  activities	  that	  national	  authorities	  regard	  as	  strategic	  and	  sensitive	  from	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  standpoint,	  most	  strategic/national	   security	  sectors	  must	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  SGEIs	  under	  EU	  law,	  since	  they	  are	  non-­‐economic	  activities	  stricto	  sensu.	  In	  my	  discussion,	  I	  will	  not	  deal	  with	  crucial	  problems	  concerning	  the	  definition	  and	  supply	  of	  SGEIs,	  which	  have	  been	  widely	  covered	  in	  the	  literature.3	  Rather,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  one	  specific	  
                                                            
1 On this term, namely on the economic element defining the activity rather than the ‘interest’ pursued see, inter alia, 
BUENDIA SIERRA 1999, 301-303; NEERGAARD 2009 (I), 23-24; GALLO 2010, 363-370; contra WACHSMANN, BERROD 
1994, 56-68.  
2 On the distinction between SGEIs and non-economic social services of general interest see, amongst others, 
HATZOPOULOS 2012 (I). 
3 For instance, I will not venture in investigating the evolving and functional – rather than static and institutional – 
notion of ‘economic’, in light of antitrust and free movement case laws. On this topic see, ex multis, BUENDIA SIERRA 
1999, 46-63; ODUDU 2006, 23-56; ID. 2009; SAUTER, SCHEPEL 2009, 75-83; GALLO 2010, 234-372; on SGEIs, social 




aspect:	   the	   CJEU’s	   case	   law4	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘golden	   shares’/‘golden	   powers’/‘golden	  rules’/‘goldene	  Aktien’/‘actions	  privilégiées’,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  special	  powers	  held	  by	  the	  State	  in	  formerly	  public	  companies	  where	   the	  rights	  conferred	  on	  shareholders	  by	  ordinary	   law	  are	  reduced	  for	   the	  benefit	  of	  public	  entities.5	  There	   is,	   indeed,	  a	  manifest	  relationship	  between	  golden	   shares	   and	  SGEIs:	  with	   the	   exception	  of	  Commission	   v.	   Germany	   of	   23	  October	  2007	  and	  Commission	  v.	  Germany	  of	  22	  October	  2013	  (both	  on	  Volkswagen),	  all	  judgments	  rendered	  by	   the	   CJEU	   concerned	   golden	   shares	   held	   by	   the	   State	   in	   undertakings	   entrusted	  with	   the	  provision	  of	  SGEIs.6	  Besides	   European	   golden	   shares,	   my	   contribution	   will	   deal	   with	   the	   access	   to	   the	   EU’s	  market	   of	   non-­‐EU	   public/private	   hybrids,	   namely	   sovereign	   investors	   such	   as	   sovereign	  wealth	   funds	   (“SWFs”)	   and	   state	   owned	   enterprises	   (“SOEs”).	   Since	   these	   entities	   currently	  invest	  both	  in	  SGEIs	  and	  strategic/national	  security	  sectors,	  it	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs	  invest	  or	  intend	  to	  invest	  in	  companies	  in	  which	  the	  State	  often	  holds	  special	  powers	  of	  intervention.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   two	  main	   issues	  arise:	  whether	  those	  powers	  are	   legitimate	  under	  the	  EU	  freedoms,	  and	  whether	  the	  State	  may	  block	  or	  limit	  the	  entry	  of	  State-­‐controlled	  entities	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  national	  companies.	  I	  will	  begin	  my	  analysis	  by	  examining	  the	  concept	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  protectionism	  in	  the	  context	   of	   the	   relationships	   between	   golden	   shares,	   sovereign	   investments,	   SGEIs	   and	  strategic	  industries.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  evaluating	  the	  function	  and	  relevance	  of	  solidarity	  within	   the	   EU	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   scope	   and	   rationale	   of	   the	   free	  movement	  rules	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  EU	  and	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  (1.2).	  As	  to	  the	  first	  aim	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  will	   investigate	  in	  what	  sense,	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  for	  what	   reasons	   the	  golden	  shares	   jurisprudence	   represents	  a	  privileged	  –	  although	  atypical	  –	  
sedes	  materiae	   to	   illustrate	   the	   content	   and	   extent	   of	   EU	   economic/market	   integration,	   the	  connection	  between	  the	  latter	  and	  the	  two	  interrelated	  concepts	  of	  social	  integration	  and	  EU	  solidarity,	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   such	   dual	   integration	   (both	   economic	   and	   social)	   on	  Member	  States’	  solidarity.	  Therefore,	  this	  part	  of	  the	  article	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  treatment	  of	  EU	  operators	  who	  intend	  to	  invest	  in	  EU	  companies.	  In	  this	  regard,	  three	  main	  questions	  arise:	  has	  the	  CJEU	  been	  too	  activist	  in	  condemning	  Member	  States	  with	  regard	  to	  privat(is)e(d)	  undertakings,	  or	  is	  its	  approach	  justified	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  EU’s	  free	  market	  objectives?	  Is	  the	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  case	  law	  likely	  to	  endanger	  the	  solidarity	  on	  which	  the	  provision	  of	  SGEIs	  is	  grounded?	  Is	  the	  scope	  of	   manoeuvre	   currently	   accorded	   to	   Member	   States	   too	   narrow	   to	   justify	   national	   socio-­‐economic	  policies	  on	  golden	  shares	  under	  the	  free	  movement	  rules	  (especially,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  further	  on,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  exceptions	  to	  these	  rules)?	  (2).	  My	  second	  general	  aim	  is	  to	   identify	  the	  main	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  access	  of	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs	   to	   the	   EU	   market	   and,	   then,	   to	   assess	   whether	   action	   by	   the	   EU	   is	   welcome	   and	  necessary	   in	  this	  area.	  The	  key	   issue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  analysis	   is	   the	  restriction	  of	  non-­‐EU	  
                                                            
4 On the role of EU Courts in ‘valuing’ solidarity see DAVIES 2010. On social solidarity, social rights and welfare see 
GERSTENBERG 2014, in this volume; ODUDU 2014, in this volume; with respect to the economic crisis, VAN 
CLEYNENBREUGEL 2014, in this volume.  
5 To be precise, the State does not even need to be a shareholder in order to enjoy certain privileges and greater powers 
of intervention with respect to former public utilities: these powers, then, can take the form not only of golden shares, 
but also of ‘golden rules’/‘special rules’; for convenience, from now on I shall use the broad term ‘golden shares’ to 
indicate all forms of State intervention in privatised companies. For a clear definition see AG Colomer’s opinion of 3 
July 2001, para. 1, in Commission v. Portugal, Commission v. France, Commission v. Belgium of 4 June 2002.  
6 See Commission v. Italy of 23 May 2000, Commission v. Portugal, Commission v. France and Commission v. Belgium 
of 4 June 2002, Commission v. United Kingdom and Commission v. Spain of 13 May 2003, Commission v. Italy of 2 
June 2005, Commission v. The Netherlands of 28 September 2006, Commission v. Spain of 14 February 2008, 
Commission v. Spain of 17 July 2008, Commission v. Italy of 26 March 2009, Commission v. Portugal of 8 July 2010, 
Commission v. Portugal of 10 November 2011, Commission v. Greece of 8 November 2012.  
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investments	   when	   the	   latter	   are	   carried	   out	   by	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs,	   rather	   than	   by	   private	  companies,	   in	   SGEIs	   and	   strategic/national	   security	   sectors	   –	   such	   as	   defence	   –7	   where	  Member	  States	  usually	  hold	  special	  powers.	  I	  am	  here	  referring	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  intend	  to	  invest	  in	  or	  buy	  out	  ‘national	  champion’	  companies	  that	  provide	  essential	  services.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  main	  questions	  are:	  is	  it	  conceivable	  a	  European	  golden	  share	  to	  restrict	  this	  kind	  of	  investments	  to	  be	  shaped	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  European	  notion	  of	  solidarity?	  Should	  the	  CJEU	  be	  proactive	  and,	  for	  instance,	  admit	  ‘new’	  Cassis-­‐Gebhard	  overriding	  reasons	  of	   general	   interest	   that	   could	   not	   be	   admitted	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   intra-­‐EU	   investments?	   Could	   the	  derogation	  provided	  for	  in	  Art.	  65.1	  b)	  allow	  for	  a	  restriction	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law?	  And	   in	   that	   case,	  what	   kind	   of	   connection	  would	   there	   be	   between	   national	   and	   European	  solidarity?	  (3).	  Finally,	  some	  brief	  concluding	  remarks	  will	  close	  the	  article	  (4).	  	   1.2. The	   term	   ‘solidarity’8	   is	   here	   used	   to	   denote	   both	   ‘market-­‐oriented’	   and	   ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	   (i.e.,	   social)	   solidarity:	   the	   first	   is	   grounded	   on	   the	   notions	   of	   Single	  Market,	   free	  movement	  and	  economic	  regulation,	  while	  the	  second	  is	  strongly	  connected	  with	  the	  concepts	  of	  welfare9	   and	   social	   regulation.10	   In	   other	  words,	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  present	   analysis,	  solidarity	   includes	   the	  carrying	  out	  of	  public	  policies	  aimed	  at	  pursuing	  both	  economic	  and	  social	  (extra-­‐commercial)	  goals.	  In	  this	  respect,	   ‘public’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  the	  State,	  but	   also	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   EU,	   entrusted	   with	   regulatory	   powers11:	   the	   ‘umbrella’	  concept	  of	   ‘European	  Social	  Model’	  derives	  precisely	  from	  this	  combination	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  needs.	  Since	  SGEIs	  –	  together	  with	  strategic	  and	  national	  security	   industries	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs12	  	  –	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  discussion,	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that:	  first	  of	  all,	  the	  concept	  of	  solidarity	  implied	  in	  those	  services	  must	  not	  be	  confined	  to	  Member	  States	  only;	  secondly,	  with	  regard	   to	   the	  SGEI	  sector,	   the	  EU’s	  notion	  of	   solidarity	  seems	   to	  cover	  both	  a	   ‘market-­‐oriented’	  dimension	  –	   in	   terms	  of	   liberalization	  and	  privatization	  –	  and	  a	   ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	  dimension	  –	   in	   terms	  of	  EU	  public	  service	  obligations	   imposed	  upon	  Member	  States	  and	  EU	  institutions.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  SGEIs	  currently	  represent	  a	  constitutive	  element	  of	  the	   ‘European	   Social	   Model’/‘European	   welfare’,	   at	   the	   top	   of	   a	   social,	   rather	   than	   solely	  economic,	  regulation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  notion	  of	  general	  interest,	  from	  a	  national	  core	  value	  –	  inherent	  in	  derogatory	  clauses	  –	  becomes	  a	  positive	  European	  value.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  contrary	  to	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  CJEU’s	  case	  law	  on	  SGEIs,	  the	  only	  dimension	  of	  European	  solidarity	  that	  seems	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  golden	  shares	  case	  law	  is	  the	  one	  defined	  by	  internal	  market	  aims	  and	  values.	  The	  EU	  erodes	  Member	  States’	  discretionary	  power	  not	   in	  order	   to	   impose	   ‘social’	   objectives,	   such	  as	  universality,	  but	   solely	   in	  order	   to	  
                                                            
7 Therefore the focus will neither be on the nature and objectives of both actors, nor on their interests in finance in their 
home jurisdiction as well as abroad. On the latter issue, especially on the extent and relevance of SWFs’ investment in 
major global banks, many of which, like Merrill Lynch, are in critical need of capital, see BUTT, SHIVDASANI, 
STENDEVAD, WYMAN 2008; DREZNER 2008; ALLAYANNIS 2009; GELPERN 2009; PISTOR 2009; PISTOR 2012.   
8 On the multifaceted notion of solidarity and its status in the EU see, among others, the contributions in ROSS 2010, 
especially BORGMANN-PREBIL, ROSS, p. 1 et seq.; JACQUÉ 2012; DAGILYTE, KUCUK 2014, in this volume. More 
generally, from a philosophical perspective, see STJERNØ 2005; SANGIOVANNI 2013. 
9 On the strong linkages (and overlaps) between the two concepts see, among others, the contributions in DE BÚRCA 
2005, especially ID., p. 1 et seq. and OTTMANN 2008. 
10 On the interplay between (social) regulation and social solidarity, seen also from a public service dimension, see 
PROSSER 2006. 
11 On the European dimension of social welfare beyond the nation state see HABERMAS 2001; contra NAGEL 2005.  
12 See infra, § 3. 
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force	  Member	  States	  to	  ‘disappear’	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  from	  undertakings	  entrusted	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  SGEIs	  that	  are,	  in	  various	  degrees,	  controlled,	  through	  golden	  shares,	  by	  national	  public	  authorities.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  golden	  shares,	  therefore,	  the	  risk	  is	  that	  “European	  [‘market-­‐oriented’]	   solidarity	   […]	   endangers	   national	   [‘welfare-­‐oriented’]	   solidarity”.13	   In	   order	   to	  avoid	  this,	  the	  EU	  allows	  Member	  States	  to	  use	  “a	  number	  of	  safeguards	  designed	  [by	  the	  EU	  itself]	  to	  protect	  national	  solidarity”.14	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  these	  safeguards,	  represented	  by	  general	   interest	  exceptions,	  have	  not	  been	  given,	  by	  the	  CJEU,	  the	  status	  they	  deserve	  in	  the	  area	   of	   golden	   shares.	   This	   is	   the	   reason	  why	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   CJEU’s	   case	   law	  on	   golden	  shares	   lies	   a	   clash	  between	   the	  European/‘market-­‐oriented’	   and	  national/‘welfare	  oriented’	  dimensions	  of	  solidarity.	  When	   we	   change	   perspective	   and	   consider	   investments	   in	   SGEIs	   and	   strategic	   sectors	  carried	   out	   by	   non-­‐EU	   actors,	   especially	   when	   the	   latter	   are	   entirely	   public	   or	   subject	  (formally	   or	   substantially)	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   a	   third	   country,	   the	   problem	   is	   whether	   the	  notion	  of	  solidarity	  may	  take	  a	  different	  shape,	  and	  whether	  considerations	  of	  public	  interest	  may	  be	  successfully	  used	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  Member	  States	  to	  prevent	  or	  limit	  those	  investments	  due	   to	   a	   combination	   of	   ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	   and	   ‘market-­‐oriented’	   solidarity,	   both	   European	  and	  national.	  The	  question	  is	  how	  EU	  institutions	  and	  national	  authorities	  should	  act	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  European	  market	  and	  society	  from	  investors	  who	  might	  endanger	  the	  national	  as	   well	   as	   the	   European	   conception	   of	   the	   regulation	   and	   provision	   of	   SGEIs	   and	   strategic	  services,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  defence	  or	  energy	  sectors.	  	  
2. Intra-­‐EU	  investments	  and	  golden	  shares	  	  2.1. As	   is	  widely	  known,	  over	   the	  decades	  EU	   law	  has	  penetrated	  areas	  previously	   falling	  under	  the	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  such	  as	  education,	   social	   security	   and	   health	   care.15	   This	   is	   even	   truer	   for	   SGEIs	   which,	   insofar	   as	  activities	  of	  an	  economic/commercial	  nature,	  have	  been	  privatized	  and	  liberalized	  –	  and,	  thus,	  are	  now	  open	  to	  the	  (not	  always	  symmetric)	  infiltration	  of	  antitrust	  law	  and	  free	  movement	  rules.16	  The	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  SGEIs,	  as	  regulated	  in	  the	  EU,	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  act	  merely	  as	  a	  derogation	  under	  Art.	  106.2	  TFEU17	  from	  free	  market	  rules	  but,	  in	  line	  with	  what	  is	  now	  Art.	  14	   TFEU	   and	   the	   Lisbon	   Protocol	   n.	   26	   on	   services	   of	   general	   interest	   (SGIs)18,	   also	   as	   a	  positive	   rule.	  A	   corollary	   of	   this	   dual	   legal	   nature	   is	   that	   at	   the	   core	   of	   SGEIs	   lies	   a	   kind	  of	  positive	   rather	   than	   merely	   negative	   integration,	   i.e.	   an	   integration	   aimed	   not	   only	   at	  removing	  intra-­‐EU	  obstacles,	  but	  also	  at	  imposing	  positive	  behavior	  upon	  (both	  European	  and	  national)	  public	  institutions.	  Most	  importantly,	  this	  also	  means	  that	  SGEIs	  are	  not	  seen	  only	  as	  a	   constitutive	   element	   of	   national	   citizenship,	   national	   solidarity	   and	   the	  welfare	   state,	   but	  also	   as	   a	   European	   founding	   value	   that	   is	   strongly	   connected	  with	   the	   European	  model	   of	  
                                                            
13 DE BÚRCA 2005, 1. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 The term “social sovereignty” is borrowed from LATHAM 2000; see also FERRERA 2005. 
16 On the relationship between antitrust and free movement (including assonances and divergences), also with a focus 
on SGEIs, see STUYCK 1999; MORTELMANS, 2001; BAQUERO CRUZ 2002; GALLO 2011. 
17 “Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a 
revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the 
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary 
to the interests of the Union”. 
18 On SGEIs in the post-Lisbon scenario see, inter alia, NEERGAARD 2011; VAN DE GRONDEN, RUSU 2012. 
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society,	   the	   promotion	   of	   social	   cohesion	   under	   Art.	   14	   TFEU19,	   the	   notion	   of	   EU	   social	  citizenship,	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	   fundamental	   social	   rights,	   as	   confirmed	   by	   the	   inclusion	   of	  access	  to	  SGEIs	  in	  the	  Nice	  Charter	  –	  namely,	  in	  Art.	  3620,	  which	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  Chapter	  on	  “Solidarity”.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  solidarity	  is	  not	  conceived	  merely	  in	  economic	  terms21,	  as	  is	  clear	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  principles	  enshrined	  in	  Art.	  1	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  Lisbon	  Protocol,	  in	  (binding/sectoral	  or	  soft/horizontal)	  secondary	  legislation22,	  and	  in	  the	  CJEU’s	  case	  law	  on	  SGEIs23:	  namely,	  access,	  universality,	  quality,	  equality,	  and	  continuity,	   just	   to	  mention	  a	   few.	  This	   entails	   an	   essential	   nucleus	   of	   public	   services’	   obligations24	   in	   harmonized	   and	   non-­‐harmonized	   sectors	   of	   general	   interest:	   the	   EU’s	   concept	   of	   universal	   service,	   to	   be	  understood	   as	   symptom	   as	   well	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   positive	   markets	   and	   rights	   integration,	   is	  paradigmatic	  in	  this	  regard.25	  	  The	   interplay	   between	   SGEIs	   and	   the	   EU	   values	   mentioned	   above	   reveals,	   as	   a	  consequence,	   a	   shift	   from	   a	   purely	   national	   concept	   of	   social	   solidarity	   to	   a	   European	   one,	  through	   the	   elevation	   of	   national	   considerations	   to	   the	   level	   of	   EU	   principles	   and	   positive	  rules	   that	   are	   best	   able	   to	   define	   and	   guide	   the	   EU’s	   policies,	   even	  with	   the	   result	   of	   pre-­‐empting,	   in	   some	   areas,	   the	   adoption	   of	   national	   policies.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   relationship	  between	   European	   solidarity	   and	   social	   regulation	   takes	   concrete	   form.	   All	   those	  principles/values/obligations	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   social	   –	   rather	   than	   solely	   economic	   –	  regulation	   that	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   redistributive	   and	   allocative	   policies	   of	   the	   Member	  States:	   a	   social	   regulation	  whose	   basic	   elements	   are	   detected	   at	   EU	   level,	   and	   according	   to	  which	  SGEIs	  do	  not	  perform	  a	  purely	  subsidiary	  function	  when	  competition	  and	  free	  market	  cannot	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   community,	   but,	   rather,	   represent	   an	   alternative	   method	   by	  which	  to	  better	  prevent	  market	  failures.	  There	  is	  no	  conflict	  in	  principle	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  general	  interest,	  since	  public	  services	  are	  included	  among	  the	  elements	  and	  objectives	  on	  which	  (not	  only	  national	   interests,	  but	  also)	   the	  European	  common	  interest	   is	  based.	  	  From	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  case	  law,	  it	  can	  be	  inferred	  that,	  when	  the	  provision	  and	  regulation	  of	  SGEIs	   is	  at	  stake,	   the	  area	  of	   intervention	  of	  EU	   law	   is	   (with	  some	  exceptions)	  competition	  law.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  ex	  ante	  (il)legality	  of	  golden	  shares	  and,	  most	   frequently,	   of	   their	   ex	   post	   compatibility	   with	   EU	   law,	   raises	   issues	   concerning	   the	  internal	   market,	   rather	   than	   antitrust	   issues.	   Unlike	   the	   case	   law	   on	   SGEIs,	   under	   free	  movement	   rules	   the	   multiform	   concept	   of	   ‘general	   interest’	   is	   always	   considered	   as	   an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  i.e.	  an	  exception	  to	  be	  invoked	  by	  Member	  
                                                            
19 “ Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 of this Treaty, and 
given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role 
in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and 
within the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and 
conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfill their missions. The European 
Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance 
with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such services”. 
20 “The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws 
and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union”. 
21 For a detailed analysis of the linkages between public services and social solidarity see ROSS 2009. 
22 See, most recently, Commission’s Communication of 20 December 2011 on A Quality Framework on Services of 
General Interest in Europe. 
23 See, for instance, BUPA of 12 February 2008, paras 166-203. 
24 On the Europeanization of public services see, ex plurimis, ROSS 2004; NAPOLITANO 2005; PROSSER 2005, 121-173; 
SZYSZCZAK 2007, 211-253; NEERGAARD 2009 (II); WERNICKE 2009. 
25 See, for instance, SAUTER 2008; DAVIES, SZYSZCZAK 2011. 
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States.	   There	   is	   no	   shift	   from	   national	   general	   interests	   to	   a	   European	   concept	   of	   general	  interest	   when	   golden	   shares	   and	   free	   movement	   restrictions	   are	   at	   stake.	   In	   this	   respect,	  European	  solidarity	  functions	  as	  a	  corollary	  to	  economic	  integration,	  with	  the	  principal	  aim	  of	  implementing	  and	  safeguarding	  market	  access	  for	  EU	  investors	  within	  the	  European	  market.	  	  	  2.2. In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  CJEU’s	  rationale	  in	  its	  case	  law	  on	  golden	  shares	  and	  then	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   and	   value	   of	   solidarity	   within	   that	   jurisprudence,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  legally	   frame	   such	   issue	   by	   investigating	   the	   principal	   features	   of	   the	   legal	   framework	  established	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   changes	   wrought	   by	  privatisation	  and	  liberalisation	  since	  the	  1990s.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  assessed	  is	  whether	  the	  EU	  institutions,	  especially	  the	  CJEU,	  have	  fully	  grasped	  these	  changes,	  which	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  viewed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  dichotomy	  between	  public	  and	  private	  spheres.26	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  understand	  if,	  in	  what	  sense,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  erosion	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘public/private	   divide’	   has	   been	   legally	   –	   and	   successfully	   -­‐	  systematized	   by	   the	   CJEU.	   To	   do	   so,	   different	   aspects	   inherent	   in	   the	   Court’s	   case	   law	   on	  golden	  shares	  should	  be	  considered:	  (i)	  the	  overlapping	  of	  private	  and	  public	  law	  instruments,	  the	   former	  pertaining	   to	   company	   law,	   the	   latter	   reflecting	   the	   executive	   and/or	   legislative	  powers	  of	   the	  Member	  States;	   (ii)	   the	  gradual	   intervention	  of	   the	  State	  or	   its	  entities	   in	   the	  market	  and	   the	  simultaneous	  expansion	  of	   the	   role	  of	   the	  private	   sector	   in	   the	  provision	  of	  welfare;	   and	   (iii)	   the	   confusion	   between	   the	   core	   social	   and	   economic	   objectives	   that	  underpin	  the	  concept	  of	  general	  interest.	  In	  short,	  the	  question	  of	  golden	  shares	  raises	  issues	  that	  lie	  between	  two	  extremes:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  de	  facto	  protectionist	  behaviour	  of	  private	  companies	  acting	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  State,	  which	  is	  (supposedly)	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  the	  general	  interest;	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  principles	   and	   aims	   of	   the	   EU’s	   economic	   integration	   which	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   self-­‐regulation	   objectives	   of	   (formally)	   private	   companies,	   as	   reflected	   in	   their	   corporate	  governance	  rules.	  More	  in	  particular,	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  the	  granting	  of	  special	  powers	  to	  the	  State	  are,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  need	  to	  control,	  and	  possibly	  clamp	  down	  on,	  any	  abuses	  that	  private	   shareholders	  with	  more	  or	   less	   sizeable	  holdings	   in	   formerly	  public	   companies	  might	  engage	  in;	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  need	  to	  prevent,	  or	  to	  reduce	  to	  a	  minimum,	  the	  entry	   as	   shareholders	   in	   the	   company	   (i.e.,	   takeover	   bids)	   on	   the	   part	   of	   investors	   that	  national	  public	  authorities	  regard	  as	  ‘troublesome’	  or	  unreliable.	  	  The	  underlying	  purpose	  of	   golden	   shares	   is,	   therefore,	   the	  protection	  of	  national	   general	  interests,	  since,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  privatisation,	  the	  latter	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  ignored	  in	  favour	  of	  profit	  making,	  which	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  companies	  that	  are	  no	  longer	  public.	  As	  duly	  noted	  in	   the	   literature,	   golden	   shares	   are	   “often	  deployed	   to	   justify	   the	   State’s	   traditional	   duty	   to	  provide	   public	   services”:	   they	   are	   usually	   associated	  with	   enterprises	   that	   are	   regarded	   as	  “national	   champions”	   or	   “a	   symbol	   of	   the	   State”.	   Thus,	   “it	   would	   be	   difficult	   to	   persuade	  electorates	   that	   similar	   services	  or	  goods	  could	  be	  provided,	  not	  only	  by	   the	  private	  sector,	  but	  also	  by	  non-­‐nationals”.27	  	  	  For	  instance,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  concern	  that	  the	  acquisition	  by	  the	  French	  company	  EDF	  of	  a	  sizeable	  number	  of	   shares	   in	   the	   Italian	  energy	  group	  ENI	  may,	  unless	   subject	   to	  particular	  conditions	  and	  restrictions,	  affect	  the	  procurement	  of	  energy	  products	  by	  the	  Italian	  State	  and	  the	   supply	   of	   essential	   services	   to	   customers	   in	   Italy.	   After	   all,	   it	   is	   at	   least	   legitimate	   to	  question	  whether,	   despite	   having	   an	   interest	   in	   increasing	   its	   profits,	   the	   French	   company,	  due	  to	  its	  (direct	  or	  indirect)	  ties	  to	  French	  public	  authorities,	  may	  be	  inclined	  to	  improve	  the	  
                                                            
26 On this issue see, amongst monographs, BAQUERO CRUZ 2002; ODUDU 2006; SZYSZCZAK 2007; SAUTER, SCHEPEL, 
2009; see also AZOULAI 2010; ROBIN-OLIVIER 2010; ODUDU 2010. 
27 SZYSZCZAK 2002, 262. 
8 
 
quality	   standards	   of	   the	   services	   delivered	   to	   ENI’s	   customer	   base,	   which	   is	   composed	   of	  Italian	   citizens,	   as	  much	  as	   it	   is	   inclined	   to	  do	   so	   in	   the	   case	  of	  French	   citizens,	   to	  whom	   it	  remains,	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  more	  accountable.28	  Against	   this	   the	  point	   could	  be	  made,	  based	  on	  a	   ‘redeeming’	   view	  of	   the	  market	   and	   its	  inherent	  dynamics,	   that	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	   fully	   competitive	   regime	   in	   the	  electricity	  or	  gas	   sector	   is	   the	  most	  appropriate	   incentive	   to	  ensure	   that,	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	   its	  market	  shares,	  the	  French	  shareholder	  will	  use	  its	  best	  endeavours	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  company	  and	  its	   service	   users.	   However,	   since	   it	   relies	   merely	   on	   a	   postulate,	   the	   point	   is	   not	   only	  indecisive,	  but	  also	  open	  to	  criticism.	  Now,	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  CJEU	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  take	  into	  account	   the	   above	   considerations.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   Commission’s	   findings,	   the	   Court	   has	  condemned	   Member	   States	   under	   Articles	   49	   ff.	   and/or	   63	   ff.	   in	   all	   cases	   but	   one,	   which	  concerned	  Belgium.29	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  EU’s	  market	  access	  jurisprudence	  on	  golden	  shares	  has	  been	  highly	  expansive	  and	  invasive,	  both	  in	  the	  past	  and	  in	  recent	  times.	  This	  has	  been	  due	  to	  two	  main	  reasons,	  which	  represent	  the	  cornerstones	  of	  the	  	  reasoning	  adopted	  by	  the	  CJEU30:	  (i)	  horizontality	  under	   the	   free	  movement	  rules31	  and	  (ii)	  a	  very	  strict	   interpretation	  of	   the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  interest	  principle	  	  and	  neglect	  of	  Art.	  106.2	  TFEU.32	  	  2.3. Due	   to	   their	   being	   included	   in	   a	   company’s	   articles	   of	   association,	   the	   golden	   shares	  held	  by	  the	  State	  formally	  have	  a	  private	  law	  nature.	  So	  far,	  they	  have	  been	  introduced	  either	  following	  a	  privatisation	  law	  passed	  by	  the	  Parliament	  or,	  more	  directly,	  following	  a	  decision	  by	  a	  shareholders’	  meeting,	  without	  prior	  formal	  action	  by	  national	  authorities.33	  In	   this	   regard,	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   the	   golden	   shares	   cases,	   the	   Court	   has	   ruled	   against	   the	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  free	  movement	  provisions,	  confirms,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  Viking	  of	  11	  December	  2007	  and	  Laval	  of	  18	  December	  2007,	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  fundamental	  freedoms,	  directed	  towards	  Member	  States,	  and	  antitrust	  law,	  directed	  
                                                            
28 The example is not that unrealistic when we consider, again with regard to Italy, the agreement concluded between 
the shareholders of Telco in order to enable Telefonica España to acquire the majority of shares of – and, thus, de facto 
control – Telecom Italia, of which Telco already holds 22%. Since news broke that the agreement had been concluded, 
the debate in Italy has focused, among other things, on the need for the Government to enact the implementing 
regulations provided for in Decree Law No. 21 of 15 March 2012, starting with the one identifying relevant networks 
and plants and aimed at ensuring the minimum provision and the operation of essential public services, as well as the 
supply of goods and relationships of strategic importance for the national interest in the communications sector. The 
Decree Law, which was converted with amendments into Law No. 56 of 11 May 2012, lays down rules on the special 
powers of the State with regard to companies operating in the defence and national security sectors or carrying out 
strategic activities in the energy, transport and communications sectors. 
29 See Commission v. Belgium of 4 June 2002. 
30 Another reason is the reductive interpretation, conducted by the CJEU, of the principle of neutrality vis-à-vis the 
ownership of companies operating in the European market foreseen in Art. 345 TFEU, which provides that “[the] 
Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”. The Court, 
as observed by some authors (see THIRON 2003, 262-266; CARBONE 2011, 311-319; GALLO 2013 (I), 190-195) and by 
the AG involved in most cases, intentionally disregards the scope of the autonomy that Article 345 appears to confer on 
the Member States, with the result of sidestepping “the legal consequences that follow from Article 295 EC [now 
Article 345 TFEU]” (see AG Colomer’s opinion, of 3 July 2001, para. 39, in Commission v. Portugal, Commission v. 
France, Commission v. Belgium of 4 June 2002). Even if fundamental, the principle of freedom of movement, that is to 
say the pivot around which revolves the European ‘market oriented’ solidarity, is not in itself an absolute principle, for 
it must be balanced against other rules and constitutive principles, including the principle of neutrality. Such a 
comparison is clearly impossible if the Court requires, as it did in its recent ruling in Commission v. Greece of 8 
November 2012, that Article 345 TFEU be applied only if such application is compatible with the Treaty’s freedom of 
movement provisions, thus suggesting that the latter are hierarchically superior. 
31 See infra, § 2.3. 
32 See infra, § 2.4. 
33 On the topic see, ex multis, GRUNDMANN, MOSLEIN 2003; SCARCHILLO, 2012; RUCCIA 2013. 
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towards	  private	  persons,	   is	  no	   longer	  an	  absolute	  principle	  of	  EU	   law.34	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  case	   law	   on	   golden	   shares	   reflects	   once	   for	   all	   the	   tendency	   of	   the	   Court	   to	   put	   forward	  interpretations	   which	   recognize	   the	   inherent	   complementarity	   of	   the	   provisions	   on	  competition	  and	  those	  on	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  EU	  judges	  have	  extended	  	  the	   application	   of	   the	   former	   to	   public	   entities	   and	   that	   of	   the	   latter	   to	   private	   operators,	  undermining	  the	  assumption	  that	  competition	  law	  always	  regulates	  private	  interests	  (insofar	  as	   concerning	   solely	   undertakings),	   whereas	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   always	   relate	   to	  collective	  interests	  (insofar	  as	  applicable	  solely	  to	  state	  authorities).	  This	  (re-­‐)convergence	  of	  rules	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   objective	   of	   preventing	   certain	   activities	   from	   receiving	   special	  treatment	  based	  (only)	  on	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  the	  entity	  entrusted	  with	  their	  operation.	  	  In	   particular,	   the	   Court	   now	   seems	   to	   recognize	   the	   horizontal	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	  fundamental	   freedoms	  in	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  number	  of	  situations.35	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  original	  scope	   of	   application	   ratione	   personae	   of	   the	   rules	   on	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   is	   being	  extended	  so	  as	  to	  embrace	  situations	  which	  otherwise	  would	  not	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  Treaties	  and,	   therefore,	   to	   give	   a	   legal	   framework	   to	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   changes	   produced	   by	   the	  privatisation	  and	  liberalisation	  of	  services	  originally	  supplied	  by	  public	  utilities.	  In	   the	   field	   of	   golden	   shares,	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   horizontal	   direct	   effect	   must	   be	  considered	  in	  light	  of	  both	  the	  principle	  of	  private	  autonomy	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  (relatively)	  new	  and	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  regulatory	  socio-­‐economic	  protectionism	  that,	  while	  driven	  by	  the	  State,	  are	   actually	   implemented	   by	   the	   private	   sector	   itself,	   i.e.	   by	   privatised	   companies.	   In	   other	  words,	  even	  though	  golden	  share	  provisions	  are	  contained	   in	   the	  articles	  of	  association	  of	  a	  company,	   that	   is	   not	   enough	   for	   the	   Court	   to	   exclude	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   ‘Chameleon	  State’36,	   regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   government	   concerned	  has	  previously	   introduced	  said	  powers	  in	  its	  privatisation	  laws.	  Indeed,	  an	  interest	  or	  ‘stimulus’	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  State	  in	   introducing	   special	   rights	   in	   the	   laws	   governing	   former	   public	   companies	   is	   sufficient	  evidence	   to	   establish	   that	   public	   involvement.	   Therefore,	   in	   order	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	  provisions	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  State	  to	  be	  considered	  legal	  under	  the	  treaties,	  not	  only	  must	  it	  be	  shown	  that	  such	  adoption	   is	  not	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	  state	  authority,	  but	  any	  pressure	  from	  public	  authorities	  must	  also	  be	  excluded.	  The	  Court,	  with	  regard	  to	  golden	  shares,	  adopts	  the	  same	  functional	  approach	  used	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  its	  case	  law.	  The	  purpose	  is	  the	  same:	  to	  enable	  the	  Court	  to	  address	  changes	  that	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  viewed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres.	  The	  only	   real	  difference	   is	   that,	  whereas	   in	   its	   case	   law	  on	   the	  notion	  of	   economic	  activity	   the	  Court	   adopts	   a	   substantive	   approach	   in	  order	   to	  determine	  whether	   an	  activity	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  economic,	  in	  the	  golden	  share	  cases	  that	  approach	  is	  used	  to	  assess	  whether,	  and	  when,	  measures	   formally	  adopted	  by	  privatised	  companies	  are	  attributable	   to	  the	   State.	   Moreover,	   from	   a	   comparison	   between	   the	   golden	   shares	   jurisprudence	   and	   the	  judgments	   in	  Viking	   and	  Laval,	   the	   Court’s	   conclusion	   seems	   inevitable.	   Since	   in	   those	   two	  cases	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   rules	   on	   free	   movement	   are	   applicable	   to	   the	   autonomous	  regulatory	  power	  of	  private	  persons	  (trade	  unions)	  –	   that	   is,	  a	  power	  exercised	  without	  the	  direct	  or	  indirect	  intervention	  of	  the	  State	  –	  the	  same	  conclusion	  must	  hold	  true,	  a	  fortiori,	  for	  golden	   share	   cases	  where	   the	   State	   exerts,	  more	   or	   less	   directly,	   some	   degree	   of	   influence	  over	   formerly	   public	   companies,	  which	   thus	   represent	   the	   long	   arm	   of	   national	   authorities	  and	  their	  regulatory	  powers.	  This	  being	   so,	   the	  question	  arises	  as	   to	  when	  regulation,	  which	  pertains	   to	  public	   law,	   is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  illegal	  market	  restrictions	  that,	  as	  such,	  are	  prohibited	  by	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  
                                                            
34 See authors cited in footnote 25. 
35 See most recently SCHEPEL 2012. 
36 MADURO 2006. 
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movement.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   answer	   of	   the	   Court	   is	   very	   clear:	   whenever	   regulation	   is	  guided	   not	   by	   the	   economic	   interests	   of	   the	   privatised	   company,	   but	   by	   general	   principles	  which	  may	  affect	  private	  law	  provisions,	  whose	  primary	  objective	  is	  to	  generate	  profit.	  Quite	  clearly,	   this	  approach	   leads,	  almost	   inevitably,	   to	  a	   finding	  of	   infringement,	   since	  separating	  regulation,	  general	  (not	  private)	  interest	  and	  profit	  is	  in	  itself	  very	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  especially	   in	   the	  context	  of	  public	  services.	  That	   is	   to	  say	   that,	   in	   the	   field	  of	  SGEIs,	   the	   two	  dimensions	   of	   ‘market-­‐oriented’	   and	   ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	   solidarity/regulation	   are	   naturally	  interconnected.	  	  Although	  the	  Court	  does	  not	  explicitly	  say	  so,	  this	  approach	  relies	  on	  the	  same	  logic	  as	  that	  behind	   the	   principle,	   both	   abstract	   and	   comparative,	   of	   a	   private	   investor	   in	   a	   market	  economy	  which,	   as	   stressed	   by	   some	   scholars,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   EU	   legislation	   on	   State	  aid.37	  In	  both	  cases	  (golden	  shares	  and	  State	  aids),	  State	  intervention,	  whether	  in	  the	  form	  of	  official	  authority	  or	  economic	  activity,	   is	  considered	  legitimate	  only	  when	  the	  State	  acts	  as	  a	  market	  participant.	   In	  the	  field	  of	  SGEIs	  –	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	   inextricably	   linked	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  golden	  shares	  –	  the	  Court	  interpreted	  this	  principle	  in	  a	  restrictive	  way	  when	  examining	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   State	   compensation	   for	   the	   discharge	   of	   public	   service	  obligations	  may	   be	   classified	   as	   State	   aid.	   Its	   interpretation,	   however,	   is	  more	   flexible	   and	  expansive	   with	   reference	   to	   Art.	   106(2)	   TFEU	   and	   the	   balancing	   of	   rules	   and	   exceptions	  following	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  famous	  Altmark	  requirements.38	  The	  resulting	  increase	  in	  Member	  State	  autonomy	  has	  been	  such	  that,	  at	  present,	  it	  would	  seem	  more	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  speak	  of	  ‘a	  private	  investor	  in	  a	  social	  market	  economy’	  when,	  having	  ascertained	  that	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  107	  TFEU	  (i.e.,	  classification	  as	  State	  aid)	  are	  satisfied,	  it	  must	  assess,	  ex	  post,	  whether	  State	  aids	  are	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  2.4. According	  to	  the	  CJEU,	  “it	  is	  undeniable	  that,	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances,	  certain	  concerns	   may	   justify	   the	   retention	   by	   Member	   States	   of	   a	   degree	   of	   influence	   within	  undertakings	   that	   were	   initially	   public	   and	   subsequently	   privatised,	   where	   those	  undertakings	  are	  active	   in	   fields	   involving	   the	  provision	  of	  services	   in	   the	  public	   interest	  or	  strategic	  services”.39	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  Cassis-­‐Gebhard	  clause,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  general	  interest	  includes,	  in	  particular:	  the	  minimum	  supply	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  essential	  to	  the	  public	  as	  a	  whole;	   the	   continuity	   of	   public	   service;	   the	   security	   of	   the	   facilities	   used	   to	   provide	   public	  services;	   national	   defence;	   the	   protection	   of	   public	   policy	   and	   public	   security;	   and	   health	  emergencies.40	  This	  has	  been	  stated	  in	  abstracto,	  since,	  in	  practice,	  the	  CJEU	  has	  always	  (with	  the	   exception	   of	   one	   case	   concerning	   Belgium)	   found	   Member	   States	   in	   violation	   of	   free	  movement	  rules	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  arguments.	  Firstly,	  the	  Luxembourg	  judges	  did	  not	  accept	  that	  certain	  interests	  might	  be	  invoked	  on	  account	  of	  their	  economic	  character,	  in	  accordance	  with	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘doctrine	  of	  non-­‐economic	  considerations’.	   In	  Commission	  v.	  Portugal	  of	  4	  June	   2002,	   moreover,	   the	   judges	   rejected	   the	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   Portuguese	  Republic	   that	   the	   granting	   of	   special	   powers	   was	   justified	   by	   the	   need	   to	   safeguard	   the	  financial	   interest	   of	   the	   State:	   not	   only	   that	   kind	   of	   general	   interest	   did	   not	   fall	  within	   the	  ambit	  of	  the	  reasons	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  65	  TFEU,	  but,	  being	  an	  economic	  consideration,	  it	  could	  not	   be	   accepted	   based	   on	   the	   ‘Cassis-­‐Gebhard	   exception’.	   According	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   same	  reasoning	  was	  applicable	   to	   the	  other	  objectives	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  Government,	  
                                                            
37 See BIONDI 2010, 99-102. 
38 On these requirements see Altmark of 23 July 2003, paras 89-93. 
39 See Commission v. Belgium of 4 June 2002, para. 43. 
40 See, for instance, Commission v. Portugal of 8 July 2010, para. 72. 
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namely	   choosing	   a	   strategic	  partner,	   strengthening	   the	   competitive	   structure	  of	   the	  market	  concerned	  or	  modernising	  and	  increasing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  	  Secondly,	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   general	   interests	   invoked	  by	   the	  Member	   States,	   the	  Court	  interpreted	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   number	   of	   cumulative	  requirements	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  national	  legislation	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law.	  Said	  requirements,	  interpreted	  in	  a	  restrictive	  way	  by	  the	  EU	  judges,	  include:	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	   special	   powers	   at	   issue;	   a	   provision	   for	   judicial	   review	   to	   determine	  whether	   they	   are	  illegal;	  a	  system	  of	  ex	  post	  control,	  rather	  than	  prior	  authorisation	  or	  systematic	  approval,	  of	  corporate	  resolutions;	  and,	  most	   importantly,	   the	  unavailability,	  even	   in	  the	  abstract,	  of	   less	  restrictive	  measures	  by	  which	  to	  achieve	  the	  object	  pursued.	  Particularly	   in	  this	   last	  regard,	  the	  Court	  tied	  the	  justification	  of	  golden	  shares	  provisions	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  “genuine	  and	  sufficiently	  serious	  threat”	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  public	  services	  which,	  as	  such,	  affects	  “one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  society”.41	  The	  result	  has	  been	  the	  priority	  given	  to	  a	  ‘market-­‐oriented’	  dimension	  of	  solidarity,	  to	  free	  market	   objectives	   and,	   finally,	   to	   EU	   economic	   integration	   over	   social,	   welfare	   and	   general	  interest	  national	  considerations,	  i.e.	  the	  ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	  dimension	  of	  solidarity.	  	  Together	   with	   the	   restrictive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality,	   the	  transposition	  of	  the	  	  ‘doctrine	  of	  non-­‐economic	  considerations’	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  golden	  shares	  has	   led	   the	   Court	   to	   rule	   against	   EU	   governments	   and	   their	   respective	   national	   legislation,	  from	   the	  point	   of	   view	  not	   only	   of	   the	  ex	   ante	   legitimacy	  of	   special	   rights,	   but	   also	   of	   their	  actual	   compatibility	   with	   the	   treaties,	   so	   that,	   de	   facto,	   the	   Member	   States’	   discretionary	  powers	  have	  been	  greatly	  reduced	  and	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  sovereignty	  undermined.	  In	  this	  regard,	   it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  there	  is	  another	  tool	  to	  reach	  a	  fair	  balancing	  between	  the	   interests	  of	   the	  market	  and	  those	  of	   the	  State	  and	  to	   find	  the	  right	  equilibrium	  not	  only	  between	  European	  market-­‐oriented	  solidarity	  and	  national	  social	  solidarity,	  but	  also	  to	  attract	  in	  the	  EU	  competence	  values	  and	  goals	  detaching	  them	  from	  a	  dimension	  purely	  national.	  I	  am	  referring	   to	   Art.	   106(2)	   TFEU,	   which	   provides,	   as	   is	   well	   known,	   that	   “[u]ndertakings	  entrusted	  with	   the	  operation	  of	  services	  of	  general	  economic	   interest	   [...]	  shall	  be	  subject	   to	  the	  rules	  contained	  in	  the	  Treaties,	   in	  particular	  to	  the	  rules	  on	  competition,	   in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  application	  of	  such	  rules	  does	  not	  obstruct	  the	  performance,	  in	  law	  or	  in	  fact,	  of	  the	  particular	  tasks	  assigned	  to	  them”.42	  	  After	  the	  strong	   ‘neoliberalism’	  which	  followed	  the	  privatisation	  and	  liberalisation	  period	  and	  was	   aimed	   at	  market	   integration,	   and	   since	   the	   judgment	   in	  Corbeau	   of	   19	  May	   1993,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tendency,	  even	  if	  somewhat	  wavering	  and	  disharmonious43,	  towards	  a	  more	  flexible	   interpretation	   of	   the	   provision.44	   More	   specifically,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   concept	   of	  ‘obstacle’,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   shift	   from	   the	   absolute	   incompatibility	   of	   the	   application	   of	  competition	   rules	   with	   the	   performance	   of	   a	   general	   interest	   task	   under	   “economically	  acceptable	   conditions”45	   to	   the	   requirement	   that	   the	   application	   of	   EU	   rules	   make	   that	  performance	  not	   indispensable	  but	  (only)	  more	  difficult.	  This	  has	  resulted	   in	  an	  extension	  of	  the	   Member	   States’	   scope	   for	   action	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   welfare	   and	   the	  economy.	  	  
                                                            
41 See Commission v. Spain of 14 February 2008, para. 47. 
42 On such rule see, most recently, NEERGAARD 2011; BUENDIA SIERRA 2012; HATZOPOULOS 2012 (II), 86-96.  
43 See, for instance, Dusseldorp of 25 June 1998, para. 67. 
44 See, amongst others, Correos of 15 November 1997, paras 34-36; on the topic see also the considerations made by 
SCHWEITZER 2011. 
45 Corbeau, paras 16-18. 
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Based	  on	  what	  has	  been	  said	  so	   far,	   the	  question	  may	   legitimately	  be	  asked	  whether	  Art.	  106(2)	  TFEU	  can	  offer	  Member	  States	  a	  wider	  scope	   for	   intervention	  with	  regard	   to	  golden	  shares,	  given	  that	  the	  criterion	  of	  “economically	  acceptable	  conditions”	  does	  not	  seem	  as	  strict	  as	   that	   adopted	   in	   the	   golden	   share	   case-­‐law	   in	   relation	   to	   overriding	   requirements	   in	   the	  general	  interest	  –	  namely,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	   ‘genuine	  and	  serious	  threat’	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  particular	  tasks	  assigned	  to	  the	  companies	  concerned.	  So	  far,	  national	  governments	  have	  not	  realised	  the	  potential	  of	  Art.	  106(2)	  TFEU,	  as	  an	  effective	  tool	  of	  social/welfare	  solidarity,	  with	  respect	  to	  golden	  shares.	  The	  provision	  has	  been	  invoked	  –	   if	  at	  all	  –	  only	  superficially	  and	   almost	   incidentally,	   although	   its	   applicability	   has	   been	   implicitly	   established	   in	  
Commission	  v.	  Belgium	  of	  4	  June	  2002	  and	  Commission	  v.	  Spain	  of	  13	  May	  2003,	  but	  challenged	  in	  the	  recent	  judgment	  in	  Commission	  v.	  Portugal	  of	  10	  November	  2011.	  The	  Court’s	   lack	  of	   clarity	  on	   the	   role	  and	   function	  of	  Art.	  106(2)	  TFEU	   in	   the	  context	  of	  golden	   shares	   and,	   more	   generally,	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   must	   be	   sharply	   criticized:	   not	  only	  because	  it	  obviously	  raises	  problems	  of	  legal	  certainty,	  but,	  most	  importantly,	  because	  it	  might	  be	  construed	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  preventing,	  or	  greatly	  limiting,	  the	  use	  of	  a	  provision	  that,	  by	  its	  nature,	  is	  applicable	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  First	  of	  all,	  Art.	  106(2)	  TFEU	  is	  an	  atypical	  derogation	  from	  competition	  law.46	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  directed	  not	  only	  towards	  undertakings,	  but	  also	  towards	  Member	  States,	  even	  if	  its	  position	  in	   Section	  1	   (“Rules	   applying	   to	  undertakings”)	  of	   the	  TFEU	  may	   suggest	  otherwise.	  This	   is	  clearly	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   practice,	   the	   European	   institutions	   apply	   it	   when	  addressing	   public	   authorities,	  which	   thus	   become	   the	   addressees	   of	   the	   provision	   together	  with	   the	   companies	   concerned.	   Second,	   Art.	   106(2)	   TFEU	   does	   not	   simply	   introduce	   a	  derogation	  from	  Art.	  106(1)	  TFEU:	  the	  personal	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  similar	  but	  not	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  former,	  since	  not	  all	  undertakings	  which	  operate	  SGEIs	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  paragraph	  2	  are	  undertakings	  which	  have	  been	  granted	  special	  or	  exclusive	  rights	  under	   paragraph	   1.47	   Third,	   Art.	   106(2)	   TFEU,	   in	   providing	   that	   “[u]ndertakings	   entrusted	  with	   the	  operation	  of	   services	  of	  general	  economic	   interest	   [...]	   shall	  be	   subject	   to	   the	   rules	  contained	  in	  the	  Treaties,	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  rules	  on	  competition,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  application	  of	  such	  rules	  does	  not	  obstruct	  the	  performance	  [...]	  of	  the	  particular	  tasks	  assigned	  to	  them”,	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	   these	   	   undertakings	   can	   be	   treated	   differently	   not	   only	   in	   relation	   to	  antitrust	   law,	   but	   also	   other	   primary	   law	   rules,	   especially	   the	   freedoms	   of	  movement	   (and	  state	  aid	  rules).	  	  As	  a	  final	  observation,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  application	  of	  Art.	  106(2)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  golden	  shares	  would	  clear	  up	  a	  major	  inconsistency	  between	  earlier	  case	  law	  and	  a	  number	  of	  decisions	   on	   special	   powers.	   The	   inconsistency	   concerns	   the	   supposed	   irrelevance	   of	  economic	  considerations	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fundamental	  freedoms,	  a	  problem	  which,	  as	  already	  noted,	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Court	   has	   refused	   to	   accept	   justifications	   of	   a	   purely	  economic	  nature.	  	  A	  strict	  and	  fundamentalist	  application	  of	  the	  “doctrine	  of	  non-­‐economic	  considerations”48	  is	  unconvincing	  for	  two	  reasons.49	  First,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  financial	  balance	  of	  the	  State	  –	  as	  the	  main	  justification	  invoked	  by	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  golden	  shares	  case-­‐law	  –	  has	  a	  central	  importance	  and	  has	  been	  subsequently	  accepted	  by	  the	  Court	  (mainly,	  but	  not	  only50)	   in	   its	  
                                                            
46 See GALLO 2013 (II). 
47 See BUPA, para. 179, cited above.  
48 See, ex multis, VAN DER WOUDE 1992, 63; WACHSMANN, BERROD 1994, 56-58. 
49 In this regard see also BUENDIA SIERRA 1999, 301-303, 337-338, 355-358; HATZOPOULOS 2000, 78-79; 
MORTELMANS 2001, 637; SNELL 2005; GEORGIADIS 2006, 199-203; BARNARD 2009, 279-280. 
50 See, for instance, Openbaar Ministerie of 6 October 1987, Rosks of 24 February 1994, Jørgensen of 6 April 2000, 
Finalarte of 25 October 2001. 
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case	  law	  on	  services,	  social	  security	  and	  patients’	  rights51.	  Second,	  when	  public	  services	  are	  at	  stake	   in	   the	   context	   of	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	   interests	  inevitably	  interpenetrate	  and	  overlap.52	  Ensuring	   financial	   balance	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   services	   is	   precisely	   the	   objective	  underlying	  Art.	  106(2),	  as	  confirmed	  by	  many	  judgments,	  starting	  with	  Corbeau.	  Now,	  also	  in	  the	   field	  of	  golden	  shares,	   financial	  balance	  constitutes	  an	  objective	  that	  serves	  to	  achieve	  a	  further	   purpose:	   to	   provide	   that	   service	   adequately	   and	   under	   economically	   acceptable	  conditions.	  To	  conclude,	  Art.	  106(2)	  TFEU	  is	  a	  derogation	  originally	  introduced	  in	  antitrust	  law,	  under	  which	  the	  only	  admissible	  exceptions	  should	  be	  those	  of	  an	  economic	  nature.	  This,	  however,	  does	   not	   constitute	   a	   significant	   obstacle	   to	   its	   application	   in	   the	   area	   of	   the	   freedoms	   of	  movement.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   European	   judges	   –	   	   as	   they	   did	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   ‘Cassis-­‐
Gebhard	  exception’	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  infiltration	  of	  (de	  facto)	  economic	  considerations	  –	  have	  already	   established	   and	   applied	   rules	   of	   reason	   of	   a	   non-­‐economic	   nature	   to	   justify	  derogations	   from	   competition	   law.53	  On	   the	   other,	   as	   repeatedly	   emphasized	   in	   this	   article,	  Art.	   106(2)	   TFEU,	   which	   may	   be	   invoked	   by	   both	   Member	   States	   and	   undertakings	  performing	  SGEIs,	   is	  applicable	  to	  and	  practically	  effective	   in	  areas	  other	  than	  antitrust	   law,	  and	  the	  more	  so	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  control	  of	  privatised	  companies,	  a	  form	  of	  state	  intervention	  in	   the	   economy	  which	   is	   structurally	   linked	   to	   “the	   activities	   of	   general	   economic	   interest	  associated	  with	  th[ose]	  compan[ies]”.54	  	  	  	  	  
3. Non-­‐EU	   investments,	   sovereign	  wealth	   funds	  (SWFs)	  and	  state	  owned	  enterprises	  
(SOEs)	  	  3.1. In	  this	  part	  of	  the	  article	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  sovereign	  investors	  who	  enter	  or	  aim	  to	  access	  	  the	   EU	   market,	   namely	   SWFs55	   and	   SOEs56,	   whose	   legal	   status	   and	   personality	   may	   vary	  significantly	   due	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   with	   the	   home	   State.	   In	   any	   case,	   the	  common	  denominator	   is	   that	   these	  operators,	   be	   they	  public,	   private	   or	  mixed	   entities,	   are	  always	   connected	   in	   various	  ways	   and	  degrees	  with	  non-­‐EU	  public	   authorities:	   they	   are	   all	  State-­‐controlled	  actors.	  In	  addition,	  they	  invest	  both	  in	  strategic	  sectors	  which	  belong	  to	  the	  State,	  such	  as	  defence	  and	  national	  security,	  and	  in	  companies	  entrusted	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  SGEIs	  that,	  although	  formally	  private,	  are	  under	  State	  influence.57	  This	  poses	  a	  twofold	  problem:	  whether	  the	  golden	  shares	  held	  by	  the	  State	  are	  admissible	  under	  EU	  law,	  considering	  that	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  behaviour	  of	  non-­‐EU	  actors	  rather	  than	  of	  EU	  companies58,	  and	  whether	  the	  State	  can	  (more	  or	  less)	  expressly	  forbid	  the	  entry	  of	  said	  
                                                            
51 From Decker of 28 April 1998 to Elchinov of 5 October 2010; on the most recent case law see CISOTTA 2013. 
52 See also AG Tesauro’s opinion of 9 February 1993 in Corbeau, para. 15. 
53 See Albany of 21 September 1999, Wouters of 19 February 2002, Meca-Medina of 18 July 2006. 
54 See AG Maduro’s opinion of 6 April 2006 in Commission v. The Netherlands of 28 September 2006 para. 30. 
55 For an overview on SWFs, from a judicial standpoint, see, inter alia, CATÁ BACKER 2007-2008; BASSAN 2011; 
CUOCOLO, MISCIA, 2012. With a focus on international (investment) law and the problems of national restricting 
measures vis-à-vis the exercise of their activities see AUDIT 2008; GIGANTE, LIGUSTRO 2010; ALVAREZ 2012; on SWFs 
and the economic crisis see MOSTACCI 2009; SUBACCHI 2012. 
56 For an overview of SOEs, see CATÁ BACKER 2010, 59-74; SHAPIRO, GLOBERMAN 2012. 
57 On similarities and differences between SWFs and SOEs see CATÁ BACKER 2010, 66-74; BASSAN 2011, 3-35; 
SCHMIT JONGBLOED, SACHS, SAUVANT 2012.   
58 See supra, § 2. 
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non-­‐EU	  actors	   into	  the	  EU	  market.59	  The	  EU	  has	  provided	  no	  clear	  solution	  to	  this	  problem:	  there	   are	   no	   binding	   EU	   instruments	   or	   judgments	   which	   regulate	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs	   in	   the	  European	   market	   or	   their	   investment	   limits.	   The	   only	   initiative	   taken	   at	   EU	   level	   is	   the	  European	   Commission’s	   Communication	   of	   28	   February	   2008,	   “A	   common	   European	  approach	  to	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds”.	  A	  preliminary	  question	   to	  be	   examined	   concerns	   the	   law	  applicable	   to	   State-­‐held	   golden	  shares:	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  or	  free	  movement	  of	  capital?	  Opting	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  provisions	   is	   not	   so	   crucial	   with	   respect	   to	   intra-­‐EU	   trade	   since,	   in	   relation	   to	   capital	   and	  establishment,	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  case	  law	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  market	  restrictions	  and	  that	  taken	  in	  decisions	  concerning	  general	  interest	  justifications	  have	  been	  in	  the	  years	  very	  similar.60	   This	   is	   why	   this	   topic	   has	   not	   been	   examined	   in	   §	   2	   above.	   Choosing	   between	  freedom	  of	  capital	  and	   freedom	  of	  establishment	  becomes	  essential,	  however,	   in	  connection	  with	  third	  country	  investment	  because,	  insofar	  as	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  are	  concerned,	  the	  rules	  on	  capital,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  have	  a	  wider	  scope	  of	  application	  ratione	  personae	  than	  those	  on	  establishment.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  may	  invoke	  Art.	  63,	  but	  not	  Art.	  49,	  when	  claiming	  before	  an	  EU	  national	  court	  that	  their	  rights	  have	  been	  infringed	  by	  a	  special	  power	  held	  by	   a	   government	  of	   an	  EU	  Member	  State	   in	   a	  privatised	   company	  operating	  within	   its	  territory.	  In	   its	   first	   decisions	   on	   the	   matter61,	   the	   Court	   focused	   its	   reasoning	   only	   on	   the	   rules	  relating	   to	   capital	   movements,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   so-­‐called	   “centre-­‐of-­‐gravity”	   approach	   first	  adopted	  in	  Fidium	  Finanz	  (3	  October	  2006)	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  banking	  sector:	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  overlap	  between	  Art.	  63	  and	  Art.	  49,	  the	  ECJ	  may	  apply	  “only	  that	  provision	  which	  it	  finds	  to	  be	  most	  directly	  affected	   if	   the	  other	   is	   thought	   to	  be	   ‘entirely	   secondary’”.62	  Subsequent	  case	   law63,	  however,	   saw	  growing	   importance	  being	  attached	   to	  Articles	  49	  et	   seq.	  TFEU,	   in	  line	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Baars	  criterion”64,	  according	  to	  which,	  when	  a	  national	  of	  a	  Member	  State	   has	   a	   holding	   in	   the	   capital	   of	   a	   company	   established	   in	   another	   Member	   State,	   the	  applicable	   national	   legislation	   falls	   within	   the	   purpose	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment	  if	  that	  holding	  “gives	  him	  definite	  influence	  over	  the	  company’s	  decisions	  and	  allows	   him	   to	   determine	   its	   activities”.65	   In	   later	   years,	   the	   Luxembourg	   court	   took	   an	  opposite	  view	  to	  that	  of	  Commission	  v.	  Italy	  of	  26	  March	  2009,	  once	  again	  revising	  its	  previous	  jurisprudence.	  More	  precisely,	  it	  returned	  to	  its	  original	  approach.66	  Finally,	  in	  the	  judgment	  of	  8	  November	  2012	  in	  Commission	  v.	  Greece	  the	  Court,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  “Baars	  criterion”,	  revised	   its	   jurisprudence	   yet	   one	   more	   time,	   moving	   back	   to	   the	   approach	   outlined	   in	  
Commission	  v.	  Italy	  of	  26	  March	  2009.	  The	  case	  law	  is,	  therefore,	  patchy	  and	  ambiguous.67	  	  The	   issue	   is	   complicated	   by	   two	   elements:	   first,	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   Treaty	   definition	   of	  ‘movement	  of	  capital’;	  second,	  the	  potential	  impact	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  applicable	  provision	  
                                                            
59 For a discussion of SWFs and SOEs in a European perspective [oppure: in a European context], see BARYSCH, 
TILFORD 2008; SCHWEITZER 2010; CHAISSE 2012. 
60 See O’BRIEN 2010, 257. 
61 See, for instance, Commission v. France of 4 June 2002.  
62 SCHWEITZER 2010, 103. 
63 See, for instance, Commission v. Germany of 23 October 2007. 
64 On the said criterion and its application also in the CJEU’s jurisprudence on golden shares see RICKFORD 2010, 81-
93. 
65 See Commission v. Italy of 26 March 2009, para. 39. 
66 See Commission v. Portugal of 8 July 2010 and Commission v. Portugal of 10 November 2011. 
67 In these terms also VAN BEKKUM 2010. 
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(freedom	   of	   establishment	   and/or	   freedom	   of	   capital	   movement)	  may	   have	   on	   the	   flow	   of	  investments	   from	   non-­‐EU	   countries	   and,	   consequently,	   on	   the	   factors	   contributing	   to	   the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  the	  EU’s	  economy.	  As	   to	   the	   first	   element,	   the	  Court	  has	  held	   that	  movements	  of	   capital	   include	  both	  direct	  investments	  and	  portfolio	  investments.68	  	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  about	  portfolio	  investments	  being	  a	  form	  of	  capital	  movement,	  the	  real	  problem	  lies	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  direct	  investment	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  that	  of	  establishment.	  Indeed,	  the	  fine	   line	  between	  the	  two	  concepts	  may	  indeed	  explain	  the	  shifting	   jurisprudence	  of	  the	  CJEU.	   More	   specifically,	   what	   is	   unclear	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   direct	   investments	  covered,	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   Court,	   by	   Art.	   63	   (i.e.,	   investments	   aimed	   at	   “establishing	   or	  maintaining	   lasting	   economic	   links”	  with	   a	   company	  and	   involving	   “at	   least	   participation	   in	  the	  control	  of	  the	  entity	  subject	  of	  the	  investment”69)	  and	  the	  transactions	  that,	  according	  to	  part	  of	  the	  case	  law	  and	  based	  on	  the	  “Baars	  criterion”,	  are	  covered	  by	  Art.	  49.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	   is	  not	  discernible,	  stricto	   iure,	  why	  direct	   investments,	  which	  Annex	  I	   to	  Council	  Directive	  88/361/EEC	   defines	   as	   the	   “establishment	   and	   extension	   of	   branches	   or	   new	   undertakings	  belonging	   solely	   to	   the	  person	  providing	   the	   capital”	   and	   “the	   acquisition	   in	   full	   of	   existing	  undertakings”,	  should	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  ratione	  materiae	  of	  Art.	  49.70	  	  A	  general	  application	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  establishment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  golden	  shares	  would	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  eliminating	  right	  away	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  proliferation	  on	  the	  European	  market	  of	  undesirable	  entities	   that	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  any	  binding	  regulations	  at	  international	   level.71	  Said	  entities	   include	   those	  with	  opaque	  governance72,	   those	  connected	  with	   non-­‐democratic	   countries,	   and	   those	  whose	   intention	   is	   to	   pursue	   political	   objectives	  and	  access	   confidential	   information,	   advanced	   technologies	  or	  natural	   resources	   (especially	  energy	   materials)	   thanks	   to	   their	   influence	   on	   “companies	   operating	   in	   area	   of	   strategic	  interest	  or	  governing	  distribution	  channels	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  sponsor	  countries”.73	  Therefore,	  when	  the	  provision	  of	  SGEIs	  is	  at	  stake,	  the	  main	  concerns	  are	  defence,	  national	  security,	  and	  welfare.74	  	  The	   reasons	  why,	  under	  EU	   law,	  direct	   investments	  are	   currently	   covered	  by	  Art.	  63	  are	  first	   of	   all	   political,	   as	  well	   as	   economic	   -­‐	   and	  here	  we	  have	   the	   second	  element	  mentioned	  above.	  The	  choice	  to	  opt	  for	  Art.	  49	  alone	  would,	  in	  fact,	  	  have	  a	  potentially	  devastating	  impact	  on	  investment	  flows,	  and	  thus	  affect	  the	  growth	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  European	  market,	  insofar	  as	   it	  would	  prevent	  precisely	  the	  inflow	  of	  capital	   from	  third	  country	  investors,	  who	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  exercise	  the	  free	  movement	  rights	  conferred	  on	  them	  by	  Art.	  63,	  but	  not	  Art.	   49.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	   other	   reasons	   of	   a	   legal	   nature:	   the	   application	   of	   Art.	   49	  would	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   in	   conflict	  with	   international	   agreements	   of	   the	   EU	  with	   third	  
                                                            
68 Generally on the topic see HINDELANG 2009. 
69 BENYON 2010, 1. 
70 See also RICKFORD 2010, 91-93; TORRENT 2012, 548-560. 
71 On the international soft law regulating sovereign investment, including the Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices for SFWs – so-called ‘Santiago principles’ – available at http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf, as well as on the need for global standards for SWFs DE BELLIS 2011; DAS, 
MAZAREI, STUART 2012; GORDON, GAUKRODGER 2012.  
72 On the issue of transparency see REED 2009; WONG 2009; BELLIS 2011; AVENDAÑO, SANTISO 2012; CLODFELTER, 
GUERRERO 2012; DESOUZA, REISMAN 2012. 
73 See European Commission’s Communication “A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds”, para. 2.2.  
74 On these concerns see COOKE 2009; SAXON 2009. 
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countries	   as	   regards	   the	   new	   exclusive	   competence	   provided	   for	   in	   Articles	   20675	   and	  207(1)76	  TFEU	  with	  Art.	  3	  TFEU77,	  where	  the	  agreements	  themselves	  permit	  the	  entry	  of	  said	  investments	  into	  the	  European	  internal	  market.78	  Apart	   from	   the	   obvious	   consideration	   that,	   besides	  presenting	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  Union,	   the	  new	   economic-­‐financial	   actors	   which	   have	   emerged	   on	   the	   international	   scene	   represent	  important	  opportunities	  for	  economic	  growth	  and	  provide	  liquidity79,	  it	  must	  be	  stressed	  that,	  in	  any	  event,	  a	  different	  approach	  to	   the	  rules	  on	  the	  right	  of	  establishment	  would	  not	  be	  a	  solution	  to	  all	  the	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  access	  to	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  of	  third-­‐country	  investors	  whom	  EU	   governments	   regard	   as	   undesirable.	   At	   present,	   neither	   secondary	   law	  nor	   the	   case	   law	   based	   on	   Art.	   54	   TFEU	   prevent	   non-­‐EU	   natural	   or	   legal	   persons	   from	  establishing	   companies	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   law	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  enjoying	   the	   rights	   arising	  under	  Art.	   49	  et	   seq.	   TFEU	  –	   companies	  whose	   registered	  office,	  central	  administration	  or	  principal	  place	  of	  business	  is	  located	  within	  the	  Union	  and	  which,	  as	  a	   result,	  must	  be	   treated	   in	   the	   same	  way	  as	  natural	  persons	  who	  are	  nationals	  of	  Member	  States.	   Since	   that	   constitutes	   a	   circumvention	   of	   prohibitions	   contained	   in	   EU	   law,	   the	  question	  may	  thus	  arise	  as	  to	  whether,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions,	  the	  principle	  of	  abuse	  of	  law	  applies	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  such	  companies.80	  As	  with	  all	  situations	  in	  which	  rules	  are	  evaded,	   what	   needs	   to	   be	   determined	   here	   is	   the	   dividing	   line	   between	   the	   indirect	   but	  legitimate	   exercise	   of	   the	   right	   of	   establishment	   and	   the	   deliberate	   circumvention	   of	   that	  right,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  principles	  and	  rules	  of	  the	  Union.	  	  	   3.2.	   Choosing,	   once	   again,	   the	   notion	   of	   solidarity	   as	   the	  main	   tool	   of	   analysis,	   the	  main	  questions	   are:	  what	   kind	  of	   restrictive	  measures	   can	  Member	   States	   adopt	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   non	  EU	  sovereign	   investors?	   Is	  a	  European	  golden	  share	  a	  viable	  option?	  And,	   if	  so,	  how	  could	   it	  be	  regulated	  at	  the	  secondary	  normative	  level?	  	  Unlike	   EU	   golden	   shares,	   where	   two	   national	   interests	   clash	   against	   each	   other,	   in	   the	  context	  of	  special	  powers	  directed	  at	  limiting	  or	  even	  impeding	  the	  entry	  of	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs,	  the	   national	   interest	   overlaps	   with	   the	   EU	   interest.	   Here,	   the	   concerns,	   rather	   than	   purely	  national,	   are	  European	   concerns.	  The	   concept	  of	  national	   solidarity	   seems,	   indeed,	   to	  blend	  with	   that	  of	  EU	  solidarity,	   since	  both	   imply	  not	  only	  an	  economic	  dimension,	  but	  also	   -­‐	  and	  most	  importantly	  -­‐	  	  a	  ‘welfare’/social	  dimension	  of	  solidarity,	  unlike	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  case	  of	  intra-­‐EU	  golden	  shares,	  where	  the	  two	  dimensions	  (i.e.,	  	  national	  ‘welfare	  solidarity’	  and	  EU	  ‘economic	  solidarity’)	  	  clash	  against	  each	  other.81	  
                                                            
75 “By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common 
interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade 
and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers”. 
76 “The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export 
policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common 
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action”. 
77 “The Union shall have exclusive competence” in the field of “common commercial policy”.  
78 On the EU and foreign investments see the contributions in BUNGENBERG, GRIEBEL, HINDELANG 2011 and 
DIMOPOULOS 2011. 
79 On the topic see SUBACCHI 2012. 
80 On the various dimensions of the said principle see CERIONI 2006 and the contributions in DE LA FEIRA, VOGENAUER 
2011.  
81 See supra, § 2. 
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There	   are	  numerous	  questions	   to	  be	   answered:	  what	  kind	  of	   general	   interest	   exceptions	  can	  Member	   States	   employ	   to	   restrict	   investments	  made	   by	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs?	   Should	   those	  exceptions	  operate	  differently	  when	  the	   investment	   is	  aimed	  at	  acquiring	  shares	   in	   ‘normal’	  economic	   operators,	   such	   as	   Sainsbury	   and	   Real	   Madrid,	   or	   when	   assets	   belong	   to	   public	  services’	  providers	  or	  national	  security/defence	  institutions?	  Should	  they	  operate	  differently	  depending	  on	  the	  provisions	  on	  disclosure,	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  contained	  in	  the	  bylaws	   of	   individual	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs	   or,	   rather,	   on	   the	   level	   of	   protection	   and	   respect	   of	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  afforded	  in	  the	  home	  country?	  Finally,	  and	  most	  importantly:	  how	   could	   the	   EU	   and	   Member	   States	   respond	   to	   the	   threats	   represented	   by	   the	   possible	  entry	  into	  the	  European	  market	  of	  undesirable	  non-­‐EU	  State-­‐controlled	  entities?	  Quite	  clearly,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  reaching	  a	  fair	  balance	  between	  market	  access	  and	  public	  interest	  considerations.	  Despite	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  above	   issues	  and	   the	   fact	   that	  –	  as	  noted	  by	   the	  European	  Commission	   in	   its	   Communication,	   “A	   common	   European	   approach	   to	   Sovereign	   Wealth	  Funds”	   –	   “a	   common	   EU	   approach	   would	   maximise	   European	   influence	   in	   these	   wider	  discussions”,	   at	   EU	   level	   there	   is	   still	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   and	   legal	   certainty	   in	   this	   respect.82	  	  Moreover,	  if	  the	  EU	  fails	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  common	  line	  of	  action,	  each	  Member	  State	  may	  resort	  to	  its	  own	  measures.	  	  At	  EU	   level,	   a	   possible	   option	   could	  be	   the	   adoption,	   at	   normative	   level,	   of	   a	   binding	   act	  through	  which	  the	  EU	  could	  address	  concerns	  related	  to	  the	  nature,	  aims	  and	  origins	  of	  those	  actors	  who	  intend	  to	  invest	  in	  strategic	  sectors	  of	  EU	  Member	  States,	  by	  elevating	  them	  from	  a	  national	  level	  to	  a	  European	  one.83	  This	  measure	  would	  enable	  EU	  institutions	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  types	  of	  investors,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  different	  types	  of	  EU	  companies	  whose	  assets	  those	  investors	  intend	  to	  acquire.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  the	  only	  possible	  legal	  basis	  for	   such	   a	   measure	   would	   be	   Art.	   64(3)	   TFEU,	   which	   provides	   for	   a	   derogation	   from	   the	  principle	   of	   liberalization	   of	   capitals	   with	   third	   countries	   where	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   “only	   the	  Council,	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  special	  legislative	  procedure,	  may	  unanimously,	  and	  after	  consulting	   the	   European	  Parliament,	   adopt	  measures	  which	   constitute	   a	   step	   backwards	   in	  Union	  law	  as	  regards	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  to	  or	  from	  third	  countries”.	  However,	   the	   requirement	   of	   unanimity	   clearly	   represents	   an	   obstacle	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	  such	  measures,	  due	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  numerous	  divergences	  among	  Member	  States	   in	   the	  field.	   In	  this	  respect,	   it	  must	  also	  be	  recalled	  that,	   if	  a	  horizontal	  measure	  –	   in	  the	   form	  of	  a	  regulation	  or	  decision	  –	  is	  adopted,	  EU	  institutions	  will	  obviously	  need	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	   standardizing	   and	   unifying	   the	   existing	   provisions	   on	   the	   scope	   and	   limits	   of	   Member	  States’	   powers	   of	   intervention	   over	   non-­‐EU	   investors,	   as	   contained	   in	   sectoral	   secondary	  legislation	  on	  electricity,	  gas,	  and	  air	  transport84.	  	  Another,	  more	  feasible	  option	  could	  be	  a	  statement	  of	  views	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  CJEU	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  general	  interest	  exceptions	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  provisions	  in	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐EU	  State-­‐controlled	  entities.	  So	  far,	  the	  Court	  has	  not	  been	  encouraged	  by	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs,	  by	  national	  judges,	  or	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  to	  specify	  the	  scope	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  derogations	  envisaged	  under	  the	  
                                                            
82 See para. 3.2. 
83 A directive or regulation on SWFs and SOEs could, in addition, be preceded by the adoption of a new soft-law 
instrument aimed at updating the European Commission’s Communication of 28 February 2008 entitled “A common 
European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds”.   
84 See Art. 11 of Directive 2009/72/CE and Directive 2009/73/CE as well as Art. 4 of Regulation 2407/92. On the topic 
see TORRENT 2012, 558-561. 
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TFEU,	  or	  those	  of	  the	  justifications	  the	  CJEU	  has	  itself	  provided	  and	  may	  consider	  admissible	  under	  EU	  law.85	  	  As	   to	   the	  derogations,	   the	  only	  provision	   that	  Member	  States	  may	  employ	   is	  Art.	  65.1	  b),	  according	  to	  which	  national	  authorities	  have	  the	  right	  to	  “to	  take	  [restrictive]	  measures	  which	  are	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security”.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  the	  case	  of	  those	  national	   measures	   that	   restrict	   investments	   in	   the	   defence	   and	  military	   industries.86	   More	  problematic	   is	  whether	   serious	   dangers	   for	   public	   policy	   and	   public	   security	   outside	   these	  industries	   may	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   provision.	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   national	   security	  considerations	   that	   are	   strongly	   connected	   with	   the	   provision	   of	   SGEIs,	   such	   as	   energy	  security,	   telecommunications,	   the	   protection	   of	   other	   critical	   infrastructures	   and	   the	  preservation	  of	  the	  control	  of	  natural	  resources	  by	  the	  host	  State.87	  Moreover,	  since	  there	  is	  no	   case	   law	  yet	   on	   the	   restrictions	  which	   the	  Members	   Stats	  may	   impose	  on	  SWF	  and	  SOE	  investments	   (i.e.,	   case	   law	   which	   could	   help	   clarify	   the	   issue),	   an	   additional	   problem	   is	  whether	   the	   CJEU’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   golden	   shares	   should	   be	   transposed	   with	   regard	   to	  investors	   in	   non-­‐EU	   State-­‐controlled	   entities.	   In	   this	   connection,	   not	   only	   has	   the	   Court	  maintained	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   admissible,	   policy	   and	   security	   objectives	   must	   be	   clearly	  articulated	  and	  the	  criteria	  for	  the	  State	  intervention	  must	  be	  specified	  in	  objective	  terms;	  it	  has	  also	  stated	  that	  a	  restriction	  is	   legitimate	  and	  proportionate	  under	  free	  movement	  rules	  only	   when	   there	   is	   a	   “genuine	   and	   sufficiently	   serious	   threat”	   to	   public	   policy	   and	   public	  security	  affecting	  “one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  society”.88	  	  In	  my	  opinion,	  considering	  the	  absence	  of	  secondary	  legislation	  or	  a	  CJEU	  decision	  on	  the	  subject,	   at	   present	   it	   is	   not	   Art.	   65(1)(b)	   [TFEU??],	   but	   	   rather	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   ‘Cassis-­‐
Gebhard	  exception’	  to	  non-­‐EU	  investments	  that	   leaves	  room	  for	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  flexible	  interpretation	   of	   the	   requirements	   concerning	   the	   scope	   of	   general	   interest	   exceptions.	   It	  seems	  correct	  to	  argue	  that	  one	  or	  more	  imperative	  requirements	  may	  be	  established	  in	  the	  future	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs	  into	  the	  EU	  market:	  they	  may	  concern,	  for	  example,	   the	   transparency	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   of	   the	   operator	   making	   the	   investment,	   or	  whether	   the	  activity	  carried	  out	  by	   the	   latter	   is	   influenced	  by	  purely	  political	   interests	  and,	  thus,	   may	   put	   at	   risk	   the	   regular	   provision	   of	   essential	   sensitive	   activities.	   In	   that	   case,	  national	  measures	  would	  not	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  illegal	  merely	  because	  they	  provide	  for	  a	  regime	   of	   ex	   ante	   control	   over	   investments	  made	   by	   third	   country	   operators	   in	   privatised	  public	  utilities	  or	  public	  institutions	  in	  the	  security	  sector.	  The	   result	   would	   be	   a	   distinction	   in	   treatment	   between	   EU	   and	   non-­‐EU	   investors,	   with	  regard	   to	   situations	   which	   might	   be	   dangerous	   for	   the	   Member	   State	   that	   receives	   the	  investment	   and	  where	   the	   company	   in	  which	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs	   intend	   to	   invest	   operates.	   In	  itself,	   this	  would	  be	  nothing	  new.89	   In	   its	   case	   law	  on	   taxation,	   the	  CJEU	   relied	  on	  both	   the	  extension	   of	   the	   ‘Cassis-­‐Gebhard	   exception’	   and	   a	   flexible	   interpretation	   of	   the	   principle	   of	  proportionality,	   arguing	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   wider	   autonomy	   for	   the	  Member	   States	   and,	   at	   the	  same	  time,	  of	  stricter	  control	  over	  the	  access	  of	  specific	  categories	  of	  third	  country	  investors	  to	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.90	  The	  transposition	  of	  the	  principles	  set	  out	  in	  this	  area	  of	  case	  law	  
                                                            
85 On some national legislation, within the European territory, admitting restrictions vis-à-vis non EU investors see, 
amongst others, CHAISSE 2012, 486-493; JOST 2012, 453-462. 
86 On this point see CHAISSE 2012, 486. 
87 See SCHWEITZER 2010, 108-109. 
88 See, for instance, Commission v. Spain of 13 May 2003, paras 72-74. 
89 See the observations made by SCHWEITZER 2010, 103-108. 
90 See, for instance, Orange European Smallcap Fund of 16 June 2011, where the Court stated as follows: “[i]t may also 
be that a Member State will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on the movement of capital to or from third 
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to	   the	   field	   of	   golden	   shares	   is	   certainly	   desirable,	   since	   that	   would	  mitigate	   the	   concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  to	  third-­‐country	  direct	  investments	  by	   ‘disreputable’	   operators	   that	   may	   possibly	   endanger	   the	   national	   as	   well	   as	   the	   EU	  conception	  of	  public	  policy,	  public	  security	  and	  SGEIs	  regulation.91	  It	  seems	  therefore	  feasible	  that	   EU	   Member	   States	   may	   be	   admitted	   to	   use	   specific	   justifications	   to	   restrict	   the	  investment	  made	  by	   certain	  non	  EU	  State-­‐controlled	  actors.	  This	   is	  precisely	   the	   role	  of	  EU	  solidarity	  and	  here	  is	  the	  overlap	  between	  national	  and	  European	  concerns,	   internal	  market	  considerations	   and	   extra-­‐commercial	   values,	   economic	   integration	   and	  welfare	   integration,	  ‘market-­‐oriented’	  regulation/solidarity	  and	  ‘welfare-­‐oriented’	  regulation/solidarity.	  Moreover,	   an	   act	   of	   secondary	   legislation,	   possibly	   accompanied	   by	   a	   clear	   statement	   of	  views	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  communication	  and/or	  by	  a	  judgment	  of	   the	   Court,	   would	   ensure	   that	   the	   measures	   adopted	   by	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   order	   to	  restrict	   third-­‐country	   investments	   (especially	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs)	   do	   not	   end	   up	   having	  protectionist	  effects	  92	  also	  on	  EU	  investors.93	  	  To	   conclude,	   it	   will	   be	   interesting	   to	   see	   in	   what	   ways	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   various	  dimensions	   of	   solidarity	   –	   national/European,	   market-­‐oriented/welfare-­‐oriented	   –	   may	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  policies	  is	  legitimate,	  insofar	  as	  determined	  by	  needs	  and	  objectives	  that	  are	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  social.	  	  	  
4. Conclusion	  	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   article	   has	   been	   to	   assess	   how	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   EU	   institutions,	  especially	   the	   CJEU,	   have	   addressed	   the	   following	   issues:	   	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   changes	  wrought	  by	  the	  privatisation	  and	  liberalisation	  of	  public	  services,	  the	  resulting	  blurring	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	   public/private	   divide	   both	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU	   golden	   shares)	   and	   at	  international	   level	   (SWFs	   and	   SOEs),	   and	   the	   retention,	   within	   national	   public	   authorities’	  competence,	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  strategic	  sectors.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  concept	  of	  solidarity	  has	  been	  used	  as	  an	  analytic	  tool.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  CJEU,	  my	  main	  conclusion	  is	  that,	  while	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  (too)	  activist	   in	  eroding	  the	  discretionary	  power	  of	  the	  Member	  States	   in	  the	  field	  of	  golden	  shares	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   EU	   investors,	   it	   should	   be	   more	   proactive	   in	   clarifying	   important	   issues	  concerning	   the	   access	   of	   State-­‐controlled	   entities	   such	   as	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs	   to	   the	   European	  internal	  market,	  including	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Art.	  65.(1)b)	  TFEU	  and	  the	  application	  of	  the	  ‘Cassis-­‐Gebhard’	  exception.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  hoped	  that	  the	  EU	  institutions,	  rather	  than	  considering	  the	  issues	  and	  problems	  examined	  above	  only	  cursorily,	  will	  ‘face	  up’	  to	  them	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  greater	  legal	  certainty	  and	  strike	  a	  fairer	  balance	  between	  the	  internal	  market,	  private	  autonomy	  and	  State	  regulation	  –	  that	  is,	  between	  the	  Single	  Market	  and	  the	  European	  Social	  Model.	  Only	  at	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
countries is justified for a particular reason in circumstances where that reason would not constitute a valid justification 
for a restriction on capital movements between Member States” (para. 90).  
91 See, in this regard, Art. 194 TFEU, where solidarity is put in connection with the EU policy on energy.  
92 As noted by the Court, the intention to target only non-EU investors was clearly expressed by the Portuguese 
Government in Commission v. Portugal (judgment of 10 November 2011, paras. 84-85) and by the Greek Government 
in Commission v. Greece, paras. 26-28). 
93 In this connection, it seems desirable that the EU institutions clarify once and for all whether the adoption by national 
legislators of market access provisions that, with regard to crucial economic sectors, discriminate only against non-EU 
investors violates the principle of equal treatment of shareholders set out, for instance, in Art. 3 of Directive 
2004/25/CE on takeover bids and/or whether it is contrary to the substantive and functional approach adopted by the 
Court, according to which no economic operator can be discriminated against merely on the ground of nationality, 
regardless of any serious public interest concerns. 
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that	   moment	   will	   it	   be	   possible	   to	   fully	   grasp	   the	   true	   nature	   of	   European	   solidarity	   with	  regard	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   SGEIs	   and	   strategic/national	   security	   industries,	   golden	   shares,	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs,	  once	  the	  social,	  rather	  than	  purely	  economic	  dimension	  of	  these	  notions,	  has	  been	  understood.	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